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Abstract
There is growing interest in fostering breakthrough technologies that offer ex-
ceptionally high value to society. However, when starting technology projects,
it is impossible to know which of them have the potential to lead to break-
throughs. Therefore, organizations have adopted funding policies in which on-
going projects are subjected to interim evaluations based on which some projects
may be abandoned to release resources for seizing new opportunities. In this
paper, we study which funding policies are optimal when the objective is either
(i) to maximize the expected value of the project portfolio, or (ii) to maximize
the expected number of exceptionally excellent projects that may lead to break-
through technologies. We show that the optimal policy for funding exceptionally
excellent projects is to start a large number of projects and abandon a high pro-
portion of them later, whereas the optimal policy for maximizing the expected
value of the project portfolio is to grant long-term funding to a smaller set of
projects based on initial evaluation. Furthermore, we show how the trade-off
between these two objectives depends on the initial project evaluation accuracy
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and the rate at which this accuracy improves. Our results suggest that this
trade-off is particularly significant when the initial project evaluations are very
uncertain but become more accurate soon after the projects have been launched.
In such a setting, policies that seek to maximize the expected portfolio value
may fail to promote breakthrough technologies.
Keywords: breakthrough technologies, project portfolio selection,
abandonment option
1. Introduction
T Fostering of breakthrough technologies has in recent years become one
of the key objectives of many organizations, such as governmental institutions
and public research funding agencies. The policy interest in breakthrough tech-
nologies stems from the potential of such technologies for creating extensive in-5
dustrial development, enhancing national competitiveness, and generating em-
ployment and export growth (Sharpe et al., 2013). Moreover, breakthrough
technologies may result in the establishment of ‘new technology platforms’ with
applications across a range of products and markets. For instance, Liquid Crys-
tal Displays (LCDs) developed in the 1960s have since grown into a global10
industry with applications ranging from pocket calculators to televisions and
laptops. Also, fiber-optic communication systems developed in the 1970s, to-
gether with successive waves of innovation in optical fibers and fiber amplifiers
in the 1980s, have accelerated the expansion of the Internet age by allowing
huge amounts of data to be transmitted.15
Breakthrough technologies such as those mentioned above are extremely
rare. Therefore, the objective of promoting breakthrough technologies is typi-
cally pursued by trying to identify and fund exceptionally excellent technology-
related activities which have the potential to result in breakthroughs. Govern-
ments, for instance, invest in training highly skilled staff for research labora-20
tories, provide R&D subsidies and grants to private companies and public re-
search institutes, and act as first customers for new technologies through public
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procurement (Sharpe et al., 2013). Many research funding agencies have dedi-
cated programs for supporting exceptional excellence; the National Institutes of
Health (NIH), for instance, have established a high-risk, high-reward research25
program for ‘scientists of exceptional creativity who propose highly innovative
approaches to major contemporary challenges in biomedical research’ (NIH,
2014). The European Research Council (ERC), too, seeks ‘to support the best
of the best scientific effort in Europe’, expecting that ‘its grants will help to
bring about new and unpredictable scientific discoveries – the kind that can30
form the basis of new industries, markets, and broader social innovations of the
future’ (ERC, 2014).
Decisions about which technology-related activities (henceforth referred to as
projects) to fund are typically based on evaluation of project proposals. At the
time of launching a project, however, it is usually impossible to know whether35
the project will be exceptionally excellent. Thus, to avoid the prospect of
committing resources to projects that will ultimately fail, organizations have
adopted flexible funding policies in which on-going projects are subjected to in-
terim evaluations and, based on these evaluations, some projects are abandoned
to release resources for seizing fresh opportunities (O’Connor et al., 2008; Tellis40
et al., 2009; Tian, 2011). The value of such flexibility, called the abandonment
option in the real options literature (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), has been studied
extensively in contexts where the objective is to maximize the expected value
of the project or project portfolio (e.g., Roberts and Weitzman, 1981; Huchzer-
meier and Loch, 2001; Gustafsson and Salo, 2005; Santiago and Vakili, 2005).45
Yet, to our knowledge no quantitative models have been developed to support
the shaping of policies that promote breakthrough technologies through funding
exceptionally excellent projects.
In this paper, we develop a multi-period project portfolio selection model
and, specifically, establish guidelines for the optimal funding, evaluation, and50
abandonment of projects when the objective is either (i) to maximize the ex-
pected value offered by the projects or (ii) to maximize the expected number of
projects which have exceptionally high values ex post exceeding a given threshold
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level. We establish these guidelines by solving a two-stage stochastic program-
ming problem in which the discrete decision variables consist of (i) the number55
of projects that are launched, re-evaluated, and abandoned and (ii) the num-
ber of periods for which projects will be funded before they are re-evaluated.
We also derive analytic necessary conditions for optimal funding policies, which
allows us to solve the optimization problems with a reasonable computational
effort.60
The results of our model suggest that to maximize the expected value of the
project portfolio, one should provide full funding to those technology projects
which appear the best based on the initial evaluation. This policy differs from
the optimal policy for promoting breakthrough technologies through funding
exceptionally excellent projects, which is to launch a large number of projects,65
re-evaluate most of them after some time and, based on the resulting informa-
tion, abandon a high proportion of on-going projects. The trade-off between
these two objectives is shown to depend largely on the accuracy of the initial
project evaluations and the rate at which this accuracy is improved. This trade-
off is particularly significant, if the initial project evaluations are very uncertain70
but become more accurate quickly after the projects have been launched. The
important implication of these results is that policies which seek to maximize
the expected portfolio value may fall far short of promoting breakthrough tech-
nologies, and vice versa.
2. Related Literature75
Arthur (2009) defines a technology as ‘a collection of phenomena captured
and put to use’. Breakthrough technologies are defined by Sharpe et al. (2013)
as ‘novel and discontinuous innovations that result in significant and irreversible
changes and are based on new, under- or unexploited physical, chemical, and
biological phenomena that allow order of magnitude improvements in the per-80
formance of existing products and/or the creation of entirely new ones’. The
potential for large improvements compared to existing practices is also captured
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by related terms that are often used interchangeably in high technology man-
agement literature, such as radical innovation (Utterback, 1994) and disruptive
technology (Christensen, 1997).85
The promotion of breakthrough technologies and radical innovation has so
far been examined mostly through empirical studies. O’Connor et al. (2008),
for instance, use data from 85 individuals involved with innovation efforts in
large firms and conclude that real options approaches and experimental learn-
ing have strong positive effects on innovation success. Klingebiel and Rammer90
(2011) study the innovation performance of 1500 German companies and note
better performance among those firms that allocate resources to a broad range
of projects and terminate those with unfavorable prospects. Tellis et al. (2009),
building on survey and archival data of 750 firms worldwide, conclude that the
strongest drivers for radical innovation include the willingness to cannibalize on95
the firm’s current assets to get ahead with the next generation of innovation; the
ability to realize the limitations of the current technology and the emergence of
a dominant one; and the tolerance for risks associated with trading the current,
certain profit stream for a new, uncertain one.
From the perspective of public policy, there is plenty of research on the right100
‘mix’ of policy instruments to support the performance of the innovation sys-
tem (Borrás and Equist, 2013; Marxt and Brunner, 2013; Sharpe et al., 2013).
Due to institutional factors, though, the effectiveness of such instruments – in-
cluding government incubators, seed funding, and loan guarantees – may vary
greatly between different countries (Hall and Lerner, 2009). As a general guide-105
line, Lerner (2009) suggests that the policy instruments should be sufficiently
preserving but, on the other hand, their efficacy should be regularly monitored
so that inefficient policy instruments could be abandoned or modified to meet the
needs of the changing market environment. In the context of research funding,
similar conclusions have been made regarding the need for a balance between110
committing to research projects for a sufficiently long period of time on the one
hand, and being able to seize emerging opportunities on the other hand. In
particular, short-term funding has been found to encourage risk averse research
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strategies and to generate proximate and often predictable outcomes, while high
impact research seems to be connected to the explorative mode conducted us-115
ing long-term funding (Bourke and Butler, 1999; Heinze, 2008). Due to scarce
resources, however, the provision of long-term funding necessitates highly selec-
tive funding processes which, in turn, increase the risk of failing to fund projects
that could have resulted in breakthroughs (Melin and Danell, 2006).
Although empirical studies such as these have been carried out, no quan-120
titative models of project selection have been presented to guide the shaping
of optimal policies for promoting breakthrough technologies through funding
exceptionally excellent projects. Instead, the objective of most quantitative
project selection methodologies is to maximize the expected value or utility.
The traditional approach is to compute the (expected) net present value (NPV)125
for each project and to start those projects that have a positive NPV. Since the
1990s, however, this ‘now-or-never’ type NPV approach has been increasingly
complemented and partly replaced by the theory of real options, which helps
determine how much additional value can be gained by exploiting different kinds
of managerial flexibility. This flexibility can result, for instance, from the option130
to postpone the investment until market conditions become more favorable, or
to abandon an on-going project if its interim results fall short of expectations
(see Dixit and Pindyck 1994 for an overview).
The classic result in real options theory is that the more uncertain the
projects’ future benefits are, the higher the value of the real option and the135
greater the delay in taking action (Roberts and Weitzman, 1981; Dixit and
Pindyck, 1994; Alvarez, 2001). Relationships between different kinds of options
and sources of uncertainty have been studied extensively in decision contexts
such as oil and gas investments (Smith and McCardle, 1999), new product de-
velopment (Huchzermeier and Loch, 2001; Santiago and Vakili, 2005), and de-140
velopment of renewable energy technologies (Siddiqui et al., 2007).
Real options analysis helps decide whether and when to invest. In doing so,
most real options approaches assume that (i) there is no strict budget constraint
so that all good projects can be funded and (ii) the value of each project can
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be observed at any given time. These assumptions are fairly realistic when145
considering R&D investment decisions in large private companies, for instance.
In this paper, however, we examine a decision setting that is typically faced by
public organizations, in which (i) there is a fixed budget for each funding period
that is to be allocated among projects with known costs but uncertain benefits
and (ii) the decision maker has limited possibilities for monitoring the progress150
of on-going projects. In this setting, the question is rather in which projects to
invest – in other words, which project portfolio to select – and when to revisit
the investment decision to release resources for new project opportunities. Such
project portfolio selection problems can be supported by methods of portfolio
decision analysis (see Salo et al. 2011 for an overview), which is the modeling155
approach adopted in this paper.
3. Model Framework
3.1. Model description
We consider a multi-period decision process in which the decision-maker, at
the beginning of each period, allocates a fixed budget to a portfolio of technology160
projects. This portfolio is selected based on estimates about the projects’ future
values. This ‘future value’ refers to the extent to which the project generates
results that contribute to the attainment of the decision-maker’s objectives. For
instance, the future value could be interpreted as the number of patents resulting
from the project or, more broadly, as the increase in technological capabilities165
relative to the existing technological frontier.
The future value will be realized at the time when the project is completed,
i.e., at the end of its planned duration. If a project is abandoned prior to com-
pletion, then some value may nevertheless be generated. This salvage value
(Pasternack, 1985; Alvarez, 2001) can represent improved expertise, new collab-170
orative networks, or an early product prototype built by the time of abandon-
ment (Roberts and Weitzman, 1981).
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An exceptionally excellent project (henceforth referred to as exceptional
project) is here defined as one which has an exceptionally high future value.
More specifically, a project is interpreted as an exceptional project if its future175
value is in the upper tail of the prior distribution of the population of project
values such that the probability mass of this tail corresponds to the desired
level of excellence α, e.g., the top 1% or the top 5%. This level of excellence,
together with the prior distribution for the future values, determines the excel-
lence threshold for the value that the project must deliver in order to qualify as180
an exceptional project (see Figure 1 for illustration).
Insert Figure 1 about here.
Defining exceptional projects through a threshold on the projets’ future
values captures the intuition that for an emerging technology to succeed, its
limit must surpass those of traditional technologies (Brown, 1992; Adner and185
Levinthal, 2002). This definition parallels that of Öquist and Benner (2012),
who define breakthrough research as the most highly-cited 10% among scientific
papers worldwide. Huchzermeier and Loch (2001) use an analogous threshold to
model the minimum performance required by the market for a project to yield
a premium profit margin.190
Exceptional projects are assumed to have the potential to result in the de-
velopment of breakthrough technologies. The policy interest in breakthrough
technologies stems from the recognition that they yield extremely high, indi-
rect societal benefits, which are sometimes realized only long after the projects
have been completed. For instance, the invention of the microprocessor in the195
early 1970s led to transformative societal changes by facilitating the develop-
ment of low-cost personal computers and mobile phones. Also, the invention of
the scanning tunnelling microscope in 1981 and its further development through
the invention of the atomic force microscope in 1986 were fundamental to the
subsequent development of nanotechnology, which is widely seen as the driving200
force behind a new industrial revolution (OECD, 2010).
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We assume that the indirect benefits potentially resulting from an excep-
tional technology project will not be realized unless the project is completed.
This condition reflects the empirical finding that breakthrough innovations tend
to require long-term funding to succeed (Heinze, 2008; Azoulay et al., 2011). The205
indirect benefits may, thus, be enabled only if (i) the project is completed and
(ii) its future value is in the top α-tail of the prior distribution for these values.
Nevertheless, the indirect benefits are not captured by the prior distribution
(such as that illustrated in Figure 1) but, instead are much higher than any
value that is likely to result from this distribution.210
At the time of launching projects, estimates about their future value are
uncertain. We assume that the decision-maker has the option to re-evaluate
on-going projects after some time at a given cost and, based on more recent
information, to abandon some of these projects, which in turn frees resources
so that more new projects can be launched. On this basis, we develop a project215
selection and evaluation model to study the multi-period project portfolio se-
lection process with such re-evaluation and abandonment options. This is done
from the perspective of two different objectives: (i) the maximization of the
expected future value of the selected portfolio, and (ii) the maximization of
the expected number of exceptional projects in the portfolio. For each of these220
objectives, we address the following research questions:
• How should the total budget be divided between project funding and eval-
uation costs?
• When should interim evaluations about the projects be acquired?
• What is the value of the option to re-evaluate and abandon projects?225
By addressing these questions, we provide guidelines to support the develop-
ment of optimal policies for project evaluation and funding when the objective
is to maximize either the expected future portfolio value or the number of excep-
tional projects in the portfolio. For this purpose, instead of focusing on a single
realization of a portfolio selection problem, we examine how the multi-period230
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decision process can be expected to unfold over time. Accordingly, we do not
intend to optimize the funding policy for each period separately but, instead,
determine a static funding policy that would, on average, yield the highest port-
folio value or the highest number of exceptional projects over time. While the
use of a static funding policy may seem rigid from the point of view of private235
companies, the funding policies of public organizations are often fixed within a
relatively static frame for longer periods of time due to various administrative
reasons.
We assume that the technology projects are independent in the sense that
the future value of a given project does not depend on what other projects240
are underway. Practically all technologies complement existing technologies by,
for instance, building on them (Arthur, 2009) or utilizing them as complemen-
tary assets required for generating profits (Teece, 1986); such complementarities
are, however, assumed to be captured by the projects’ future values. The case
in which these future values are independent of one another serves as a use-245
ful benchmark and makes it possible to obtain some analytic results on optimal
funding policies. Nevertheless, interdependencies between projects’ values could
be modeled by introducing ‘dummy’ projects whose values would only be real-
ized if each of the interdependent projects was funded (Liesiö et al., 2008).
To facilitate the interpretation of our results by keeping the model suffi-250
ciently parsimonious, we also make the following simplifying assumptions, each
of which could be relaxed by relatively simple modifications: (i) there are equally
many project proposals in each period, (ii) the projects are of equal duration,
(iii) each project, if funded, consumes one resource unit per period, and (iv)
the probability distributions that characterize the projects’ future values and255
estimates about these values do not change over time.
3.2. Model formulation
3.2.1. Feasible funding policies
We assume that n new project proposals arrive at the beginning of funding
period t. The duration of each project is d periods, meaning that a project260
10
launched at the beginning of period t is completed at the end of period t +
d − 1. Depending on the time span of the industry, the length of one period
can be different, varying from half a year to several years, for instance. Out
of n proposals, the decision-maker launches ` projects of which e are funded
conditionally such that they will be re-evaluated after q ≤ d− 1 periods, i.e., at265
the beginning of period t+q ≤ t+d−1. The remaining `−e projects are granted
full funding for d periods. Based on the re-evaluation, a projects are abandoned,
and e − a projects are funded for the remaining duration of d − q periods (for
simplicity, we assume that there is no delay between the beginning of the re-
evaluation process and the decision to abandon/continue projects that have been270
re-evaluated). The number of projects that will be completed out of those n
projects arriving at the beginning of period t is, therefore, (`−e)+(e−a) = `−a.
The decision variables (`, e, a, q) define the funding policy that is applied to the
set of n project proposals arriving in each period. The decision process for
projects arriving at the beginning of period t is illustrated in Figure 2.275
Insert Figure 2 about here.
The same decision process is repeated at the beginning of each period t =
1, 2, . . . The amount of resources consumed in a given period is thus determined
by (i) how many projects have been launched at the beginning of the current and
previous periods but not yet re-evaluated, (ii) how many projects have been re-
evaluated and continued based on the re-evaluation, and (iii) how many projects
are to be re-evaluated at the beginning of the current period. Each project, if
funded, consumes one resource unit per period, and the cost of re-evaluating a
project is ce. The resource consumption C(t) in each period t is, therefore,
C(t) =

t`, if 1 ≤ t ≤ q,
q` + (t− q)(`− a) + ce ∙ e, if q < t < d,
q`︸︷︷︸
Projects that have not
yet been re-evaluated
+ (d− q)(`− a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Projects that have been
re-evaluated and continued
+ ce ∙ e,︸ ︷︷ ︸
Projects re-evaluated in
the current period
if t ≥ d.
(1)
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The last line in (1) shows that the period-wise resource consumption of the
funding policy over an infinite time horizon stabilizes to d`− (d− q)a+ cee after
the initial build-up.
We denote the exogenous budget reserved for each funding period by B. The280
set of feasible funding policies is defined as follows.
Definition 1. The set of feasible funding policies is
PF = {(`, e, a, q) ∈ N4|d`− (d− q)a + cee ≤ B, n ≥ ` ≥ e ≥ a, 1 ≤ q ≤ d− 1}.
(2)
Definition 1 states that a policy is feasible if (i) the period-wise resource con-
sumption does not exceed the budget B, (ii) the number of launched projects
does not exceed that of the project proposals, the number of re-evaluated
projects does not exceed that of the launched projects, and the number of285
abandoned projects does not exceed that of the re-evaluated projects, and (iii)
projects can be re-evaluated one period after they have been launched at the
earliest and one period before completion at the latest.
3.2.2. Valuation model
The funding policy (`, e, a, q) determines the number of projects that are290
launched, re-evaluated, and abandoned. Which projects in particular to launch,
re-evaluate, and abandon, is based on estimates about the projects’ future val-
ues. Because we assume that the funding periods are similar a priori (meaning
that equally many project proposals arrive in each period and the distributions
for the projects’ future values and value estimates are the same), we can deter-295
mine the optimal funding policy by examining the decision process for a single
set of n project proposals (such as the one illustrated in Figure 2).
Let us denote by [v1, . . . , vn] the future values of the n project proposals
such that vi are realizations of independent and identically distributed random
variables Vi ∼ f(v) with a known prior f(v). The future value vi will be realized300
after project i has been completed. If a project is not completed but abandoned
after q < d periods, then the realized salvage value is h(q)vi. Here, the function
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h(q) : {1, . . . , d − 1} → [0, 1) is assumed to be non-decreasing in q, meaning
that if the project is abandoned later, then at least as much – and possibly more
– value can be retrieved as when abandoning the project earlier. Note that the305
indirect benefits possibly resulting from exceptional projects are not captured
by the future values vi.
At the time of the launching decision, the decision-maker does not know the
projects’ future values but observes estimates [s01, . . . , s
0
n] thereof. These esti-
mates represent assessments about the future values obtained through quanti-310
tative technology forecasting techniques or other methods of technology futures
analysis (Porter et al., 2004; Walk, 2012).
The estimates are realizations of conditionally independent and identically
distributed random variables (S0i |Vi = v) ∼ f(s0|v) such that the likelihood
distribution f(s0|v) is known for all v and the estimate for project i does not
depend on the future values of any other projects. Using the estimates s0i and
the distribution assumptions, Bayes’ rule f(v|s0i ) ∝ f(s0i |v)f(v) can be used to
compute the posterior distributions f(v|s0i ) of the future values (Vi|S0 = s0i )
of the project proposals given the estimates (see Vilkkumaa et al. 2014 for a
similar valuation model). The means of these posterior distributions are the
projects’ expected future values E[Vi|S0i = s0i ] given their initial value estimates
E[Vi|S0 = s0i ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
vf(v|s0i )dv. (3)
Let us denote by sqi the interim estimate obtained for project i after q periods.
Analogous to s0i , these estimates represent the updated assessments about the
projects’ future values. The interim estimates are realizations of conditionally
independent and identically distributed random variables (Sqi |Vi = v) ∼ f(sq |v)
with a known distribution function f(sq|v) for all v. The posterior distributions
f(v|s0i , sqi ) for the projects’ future values (Vi|S0 = s0i , Sq = sqi ) given both the
initial and the interim estimates are obtained through Bayes’ rule1 f(v|s0i , sqi ) ∝
f(sqi |v)f(v|s0i ). Thus, the expected future value of project i given both the initial
1We assume that given v, Sqi is conditionally independent of S
0
i , i.e., f(s
q
i |s0i , v) = f(sqi |v).
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and the interim estimate is
E
[
Vi|S0i = s0i , Sqi = sqi
]
=
∫ ∞
−∞
vf(v|s0i , sqi )dv. (4)
By definition, the future values of exceptional projects are greater than or
equal to the excellence threshold μ∗α which is derived from the desired level of
excellence α and the prior distribution f(v).315
Definition 2. Let vi be a realization of random Vi ∼ f(v), and let μ∗α be the
excellence threshold such that P(Vi ≥ μ∗α) =
∫∞
μ∗α
f(v)dv = α. Project i is an
exceptional project if vi ≥ μ∗α.
The posterior distributions f(v|s0i ) and f(v|s0i , sqi ) can now be used to com-
pute the probability that project i is an exceptional project given the observed320
value estimates:
P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i = s0i ) =
∫ ∞
μ∗α
f(v|s0i )dv, (5)
P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i = s0i , Sqi = sqi ) =
∫ ∞
μ∗α
f(v|s0i , sqi )dv. (6)
All decision variables and model parameters are listed in Table 1.
3.2.3. Optimal funding policies
We next determine the optimal funding policies (`, e, a, q). Toward this end,
let us denote by N = {1, . . . , n} the index set of all new project proposals, by325
L ⊆ N the index set of launched projects, by E ⊆ L the index set of those
launched projects that are to be re-evaluated, and by A ⊆ E the index set of
the projects that are abandoned based on the re-evaluation. These index sets
correspond to funding policy (`, e, a, q) through |L| = `, |E| = e, and |A| = a
(where, for instance, |L| denotes the number of elements in the set L). The330
optimal index sets depend on not only the expectations about the projects’
future values but also the decision objective.
First, we consider the objective of maximizing the expected portfolio value.
Based on the independence assumptions, the expected value of the project port-
folio is the sum of the expected values of the projects it includes. The funding
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Table 1: List of decision variables and model parameters
Decision variables
` Number of projects launched at the beginning of each period
e Number of projects re-evaluated at the beginning of each period
a Number of projects abandoned at the beginning of each period
q Number of periods after which projects are re-evaluated
Parameters
n Number of new project proposals in each period
d Duration of each project
1 Cost of funding one project for one period (=1)
ce Cost of re-evaluating one project
B Budget for each period
α Level of excellence
f(v) Prior distribution of the projects’ future values
f(s0|v) Distribution of a project’s initial value estimate given its future value
f(sq|v) Distribution of a project’s interim value estimate obtained q periods
after launch, given its future value
h(q) Non-decreasing function with range [0, 1) which determines the fraction of
the project’s future value that can be salvaged if the project is abandoned
q periods after launch
policy that maximizes the expected portfolio value can, therefore, be determined
by solving the two-stage stochastic optimization problem
max
(`,e,a,q)∈PF
ES0i
[
max
L⊆N ,E⊆L
|L|=`
|E|=e
{ ∑
i∈L\E
E[Vi|S0i ]+ESqi
[
max
A⊆E
|A|=a
{ ∑
i∈E\A
E[Vi|S0i , Sqi ]+h(q)
∑
i∈A
E[Vi|S0i , Sqi ]
}]}]
,
(7)
where set of feasible policies PF is as in Definition 1, and the expected values
E[Vi|S0i ] and E[Vi|S0i , Sqi ] are obtained from (3) and (4) with random S0i and
Sqi .335
The optimization is carried out in two stages: in the first stage with regard
to the funding policy (`, e, a, q), and in the second stage with regard to the index
sets L, E , and A. The maximization in the second stage is further divided into
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two parts: (i) the determination of the sets L and E of launched and re-evaluated
projects based on the initial estimates only and (ii) the determination of the340
set A of abandoned projects based on both the initial and interim estimates.
Given the funding policy (`, e, a, q), the cardinalities of these index sets remain
constant.
Second, we consider the objective of maximizing the number of completed
projects that qualify as exceptional projects. Given the excellence threshold μ∗α,
the policy that maximizes this number is the solution to the two-stage stochastic
optimization problem
max
(`,e,a,q)∈PF
ES0i
[
max
L⊆N ,E⊆L
|L|=`
|E|=e
{ ∑
i∈L\E
P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i )+ESqi
[
max
A⊆E
|A|=a
∑
i∈E\A
P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i , Sqi )
]}]
,
(8)
where the probabilities P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i ) and P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i , Sqi ) are obtained
from (5) and (6) with random S0i and S
q
i .345
The objective function in (8) does not include abandoned projects because
only completed projects are assumed to qualify as exceptional projects. The
optimization is again carried out in two stages. The first term in the second-
stage objective function of (8) sums the probabilities that the projects that have
received full funding based on initial evaluations are indeed exceptional projects.350
The second term sums the probabilities that those projects that have been re-
evaluated and eventually completed are exceptional projects. Because we have
assumed that the projects’ future values are independent and that the value
estimate of project i does not depend on the future values of other projects,
the objective function of (8) gives the expected number of funded (completed)355
exceptional projects.
The value of the abandonment option is defined as the relative improvement
in the portfolio value with the option compared to the portfolio value without
the option, i.e.,
Option value =
Portfolio value with option - Portfolio value without option
Portfolio value without option
.
Here, portfolio value with the option is the optimal value of the objective func-
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tion in (7) or (8), and portfolio value without the option is obtained by setting
e = a ≡ 0 in (7) or (8).
4. Results360
4.1. Parameters
The above model allows us to establish guidelines for funding policies that
yield either the highest expected value or the highest expected number of ex-
ceptional projects over time. Because no analytical solutions can be derived
for problems (7) and (8), these guidelines are obtained by numerical simula-365
tion. In particular, we study how the optimal funding policy and the resulting
option value depend on the problem parameters when both the prior and the
likelihood distributions (and, therefore, the posterior distributions as well) are
normal. The normal distribution is commonly used for modeling the randomness
of many types of real-world phenomena. For instance, due to the central limit370
theorem, the use of a normal likelihood is well justified if the value estimates
are averages over the evaluations of unbiased experts with equal evaluation ac-
curacies. Thus, the qualitative insights provided by this case are informative
even if the underlying distributions are not exactly normal.
We assume that the projects’ future values are realizations of independent375
and identically distributed random variables Vi ∼ N(20, 32). The initial esti-
mates are obtained from the future values by an additive, normally distributed
zero-mean estimation error term such that (S0i |Vi = vi) = vi + δ0, δ0 ∼ N(0, τ20 )
for each i = 1, . . . , n. The interim estimates are modeled similarly such that
(Sqi |Vi = vi) = vi + δq, δq ∼ N(0, τ2q ) for each i = 1, . . . , n. Typically, the accu-380
racy of the estimates improves significantly in time (Walk, 2012). We model this
improvement by relating the standard deviation τq of the interim estimate to
the initial estimation error through τq = rqτ0, where r ∈ (0, 1]. This model for
the expected evolution of the standard deviation of the estimation error results
in a cone of uncertainty (Boehm, 1981), where initially very little may be known385
about the future value of a project, but as time goes by, the uncertainty about
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this value reduces geometrically. The rate at which the uncertainty diminishes
is determined by the uncertainty reduction coefficient r.
We consider n = 200 new project proposals in each period. The duration of
each project is d = 4, the cost of funding one project for one period is 1, and
the cost of re-evaluating one project is ce = 0.05. The budget B is set so that
it would correspond to providing full funding to 30% of the project proposals
in each period if no resources were spent on acquiring interim evaluations, i.e.,
B = 0.3 × n × 1 × d = 240. The salvage value is assumed to be h(q) ≡ 0, so
that no value can be retrieved from abandoned projects. We examine how both
the optimal funding policy and the option value change as a function of the
following parameters:
τ0 : Standard deviation of the initial value estimates,
r : Coefficient of uncertainty reduction,
α : Level of excellence.
Sensitivity analyses with respect to changes in n, B, and h(q) are performed in
Section 4.6.390
4.2. Computation of the optimal funding policies
Problems (7) and (8) can be solved by simulating the decision process for
each feasible policy multiple (e.g., 5,000) times, and then selecting the policy
that, on average, yields the highest value or the highest number of exceptional
projects. For fixed (`, e, a, q), the decision process is simulated by first sampling395
future values vi and value estimates s0i , s
q
i from the prior and likelihood dis-
tributions f(v), f(s0|v), and f(sq|v). Then, the objective function (7) or (8) is
evaluated for all possible combinations L, E ,A corresponding to the fixed fund-
ing policy, and the highest objective function value in that simulation round
(i.e., given the particular realization of v) is recorded. These values are then400
averaged over all simulation rounds to obtain the average objective function
values for the fixed funding policy. By repeating this process for each feasible
funding policy (`, e, a, q), one can find the policies that yield the highest aver-
18
age portfolio value or the highest average number of exceptional projects in the
portfolio, i.e., the solutions to problems (7) and (8).405
The computation effort can be reduced by the following two propositions.
All proofs are in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Assume f(v) = N(μ, σ2), f(s0|v) = N(v, τ 20 ), and f(sq|v) =
N(v, τ 2q ) . Then, given a fixed funding policy (`, e, a, q) and estimates s
0
i and
sqi , the optimal index sets for the second-stage optimization problem in both (7)410
and (8) are
A = { i ∈ E | vqi among the a smallest }, (9)
E = { i ∈ L | v0i among the e smallest }, (10)
L = { i ∈ N | v0i among the ` largest }, (11)
where v0i = E[Vi|S0i = s0i ] and vqi = E[Vi|S0i = s0i , Sqi = sqi ].
Proposition 1 states that it is optimal to launch those projects with the high-
est initial expected values, to re-evaluate those among the launched projects
with the lowest initial expected values, and to abandon those with the lowest415
expected values given also the interim value estimates. Thus, the funding policy
(`, e, a, q) determines the optimal index sets L, E ,A completely, which consid-
erably speeds up the computation. Without this property, we would have to
enumerate all
(
n
`
)(
`
e
)(
e
a
)
combinations of L, E and A for each choice of `, e
and a. If, for instance, n = 10, ` = 6, e = 4 and a = 2, the number of such420
combinations would be 18,900.
The computation time is further reduced by Proposition 2, which states that
in the optimum, no additional projects can be re-evaluated if all other policy
variables remain the same. Given that (`, a, q) are fixed, the optimal value of e
is, thus, emax = min{`, b 1ce (B − d` + (d− q)a)c}. It is therefore not necessary425
to compute the value for any policy (`, e, a, q) where e < emax. If, for instance,
` = 6, a = 2, q = 1, B = 13 and ce = 0.2, we have emax = min{6, 5} = 5,
implying that it is unnecessary to compute the value of policies in which e = 2, 3,
or 4. Using Propositions 1 and 2, the total computation time for all numerical
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results in this paper was approximately two and a half hours using Matlab on430
a standard laptop (2.60 GHz, 8 GB memory).
Proposition 2. If policy (`, e, a, q) is optimal for either (7) or (8), then policy
(`, e + 1, a, q) is infeasible.
4.3. Features of the optimal funding policy
4.3.1. Estimation uncertainty τ0435
Figure 3 illustrates the optimal funding policy for either accurate (τ0 = 2) or
inaccurate (τ0 = 7) initial estimates, when the objective is to either maximize
the expected portfolio value (Figures 3a and 3b), or to maximize the expected
number of funded projects in the top 1% (Figures 3c and 3d). The uncertainty
reduction coefficient is set at r = 0.5, meaning that in each period, the standard440
deviation of the estimation error decreases by 50%. The figures use the following
notation:
R : # of projects that are rejected completely (n− `),
CF : # of projects that receive conditional funding and will be re-evaluated (e),
FF : # of projects that receive full funding for their entire duration (`− e),
C : # of projects that are continued based on the re-evaluation (e− a),
A : # of projects that are abandoned based on the re-evaluation (a).
Each figure profiles the decisions only for those projects launched at the begin-
ning of period 1, thus omitting – for purposes of clarity – the presence of other
projects launched at the beginning of periods 2, 3, and 4.445
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Regardless of the accuracy of the initial estimates, the policy that maximizes
the expected portfolio value is simply to grant full funding to the 60 projects
with the highest initial expected values. This policy differs from the policy
that maximizes the number of exceptional projects, which is to launch a large450
number of projects (` = FF + CF ), re-evaluate most of them (e = CF ) – in
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fact, all of them, if the initial estimates are inaccurate –, and abandon a large
share of the re-evaluated projects. When the initial estimates are more accurate,
less resources are spent on project evaluation, which allows more projects to be
completed (`− a = FF + C).455
4.3.2. Uncertainty reduction coefficient r and level of excellence α
Figure 4 illustrates the optimal funding policy for fast (r = 0.4) and slow
(r = 0.8) rates of uncertainty reduction when the objective is to maximize the
number of funded projects whose future values are either in the top α = 10% or
top α = 1% of the prior distribution. Here, the standard deviation of the initial460
estimation error is set at τ0 = 7.
If the estimation uncertainty reduces quickly, meaning that the interim es-
timates are much more accurate than the initial ones (Figures 4a and 4c), then
more projects should be launched and abandoned. The more exceptional the
projects the decision-maker wishes to fund (i.e., the smaller α), the larger these465
shares are. On the other hand, if the interim estimates are not significantly more
accurate, then it is optimal to allocate most resources to completing projects
and to spend less resources on evaluation (Figures 4b and 4d). In this case the
optimal policy is more like that in Figures 3a and 3b.
Insert Figure 4 about here.470
Figure 4 shows – perhaps counterintuitively – that the decision-maker should
wait longer before abandoning projects when the accuracy of estimates improves
more quickly: in Figures 4a and 4c projects are abandoned after q = 2 periods,
whereas in Figures 4b and 4d the decision to abandon projects is made after just
q = 1 period. This reflects the trade-off between the number of projects that475
can be completed and the amount of time the decision-maker can wait for the
estimates to become sufficiently accurate to justify the abandonment of many
projects. With r = 0.8 (Figures 4b and 4d), this takes too much time, whereby
resources should mostly be spent on the execution of projects.
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4.3.3. Estimation uncertainty τ0 and uncertainty reduction coefficient r480
Results for the optimal abandonment time q when maximizing the expected
number of projects in the top 1% based on the objective function in (8) are
shown in Figure 5 as a function of the uncertainty reduction coefficient r. In
Figure 5a the initial estimates are moderately inaccurate (τ0 = 6), and in Fig-
ure 5b very inaccurate (τ0 = 13). For reference, the optimal policy for maxi-485
mizing the expected portfolio value based on the objective function in (7) for
each combination of r and τ0 in this setting is not to exercise the option.
Insert Figure 5 about here.
In general, one should wait longer before abandoning projects when the
initial estimates are less accurate. Moreover, Figure 5 shows that the optimal490
abandonment time may first increase and then decrease in r. This reflects the
trade-off between allocating resources either to completing more projects or to
obtaining more accurate evaluations through experimentation. For instance,
Figure 5a illustrates that when r ≤ 0.4, the estimation uncertainty reduces very
fast, whereby the interim evaluations become sufficiently accurate already after495
one period to make decisions about abandoning projects. When 0.5 ≤ r ≤ 0.6,
the accuracy in the estimates improves more slowly, and, hence, the decision-
maker should re-evaluate the projects only after two periods. Finally, when r ≥
0.7, the interim estimates remain inaccurate throughout the projects’ duration,
whereby resources are optimally spent on completing more projects rather than500
launching many projects and abandoning some of them based on more accurate,
but still unreliable, information.
A similar non-monotonic dependence between the expected time-to-decision
and the uncertainty in a project’s profit is discovered by Kwon and Lippman
(2011). Based on a project’s observed profit stream, they use a Bayesian frame-505
work to update the probability that the drift of the project’s profit is either at
a high or a low state. In this setting, they note that the expected optimal time
to either abandon or expand the project first increases and then decreases in
22
the volatility of the profit stream.
4.4. Characteristics of the option value510
4.4.1. Estimation uncertainty τ0 and uncertainty reduction coefficient r
Figure 6 shows the option value as a function of the standard deviation τ0 ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 10} of the initial estimation error for different values of the uncertainty
reduction coefficient r, when the objective is to maximize the number of funded
projects among the top 1%. The figure also shows the optimal abandonment515
times q corresponding to each combination of r and τ0. Again, the optimal
policy for maximizing the expected portfolio value for each r and τ0 in this
setting is not to exercise the option, so that the corresponding option value is
zero.
Insert Figure 6 about here.520
The option value decreases in r for all τ0, meaning that the option is more
valuable when the interim estimates are relatively more accurate. However, all
three curves corresponding to different values of r first increase and then start
to decrease after τ0 reaches a certain point. The non-monotonic dependence
of the option value on τ0 stems from the fact that for low values of τ0, the525
initial decision is based on accurate information, and, hence, the option value
is small. On the other hand, if τ0 is very large, the interim estimates are also
quite unreliable since τq = rqτ0, and consequently the option value is small.
At the peak point, the value gained from reducing the standard deviation of
the estimation error by factor rq is maximal. Here, in particular, the highest530
option value (26% increase in the number of exceptional projects in the portfolio
compared to not having the option) is attained when the initial estimates are
very inaccurate (τ0 = 9), given that more accurate estimates can be obtained
relatively quickly (r = 0.4).
A similar non-monotonic relationship between uncertainty and option value535
has been discovered by Siddiqui and Fleten (2010) who study the value of the
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option for an intermediate learning stage between switching from an existing
renewable energy technology to an unconventional technology with uncertain
operating cost, the expected value of which can be reduced during this learning
stage. They show that for low rates of operating cost reduction, the option540
value of the learning stage first increases and then decreases in the long-term
electricity price volatility.
4.4.2. Estimation uncertainty τ0 and level of excellence α
Figure 7 illustrates the option value when maximizing the number of excep-
tional projects in the portfolio as a function of the initial estimation uncertainty545
τ0 for different levels of excellence α. In Figure 7a, the estimation uncertainty
reduces quickly with r = 0.4, and in Figure 7b it reduces slowly with r = 0.8.
As noted before, the option value first increases and then decreases in the ini-
tial estimation uncertainty τ0 and is higher when the uncertainty reduces more
quickly.550
Insert Figure 7 about here.
Interestingly, given that the initial estimates are accurate, the option value
is lower when the decision-maker is interested in truly exceptional projects, i.e.,
those with very high future values (α = 1%). This is because when the initial
estimates are accurate, a large share of the top 1% projects are funded just555
by completing a sufficiently large number of projects, whereby the option value
is small. On the other hand, when the initial estimates are very inaccurate,
the option is more valuable when the decision-maker is interested in projects
in the top 1%. This is due to the fact that it is not necessary to complete
many projects to fund those in the top 1%, given that the information based on560
which the completed projects are selected is very accurate. Thus, it can be very
valuable to experiment on a large number of projects, obtain relatively accurate
estimates about these projects later on and, based on these estimates, commit
resources to only those few projects that are likely to be among the top 1%.
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Based on Figure 7, the abandonment option has the most value (26%) when565
the initial value estimates are very inaccurate (τ0 = 9), the accuracy improves
quickly (r = 0.4), and the decision-maker is interested in truly exceptional
projects (α = 1%). On the other hand, if the initial estimates are very inaccurate
and the accuracy improves slowly, then the option has little value. In this case,
the interim evaluations provide poor justification for abandoning projects, and,570
hence, it pays off to use most resources to completing as many projects as
possible, i.e., to provide full funding to those projects that appear to yield the
most value based on the initial estimates.
4.5. Cross-comparison of funding policies
Next, we compare how the optimal policy for maximizing the expected num-575
ber of exceptional projects performs in terms of expected portfolio value, and
vice versa. Here, the initial estimation uncertainty is τ0 = 8, the uncertainty
reduction coefficient is r = 0.3, and the level of excellence is α = 1%. Table 2
shows the number of completed projects, the expected portfolio value, the ex-
pected average project value (= the expected portfolio value / the number of580
completed projects), and the expected number of exceptional projects in the
portfolio for two policies:
• Policy 1 (optimal for the maximization of the expected portfolio value):
- Full funding for 60 out of 200 project proposals in each period.
• Policy 2 (optimal for the maximization of the expected number of funded585
projects whose future values are in the top 1%):
- Conditional funding for 108 out of 200 project proposals in each pe-
riod,
- All projects re-evaluated after two periods,
- Out of the re-evaluated projects, 99 abandoned and 9 completed.590
25
Table 2: Cross-comparison of funding policies with τ0 = 8 and r = 0.3.
Policy 1 Policy 2
Number of completed projects 60 9
Expected portfolio value 1,273 233
Expected average project value 21.22 25.86
Expected number of exceptional projects 1.28 1.68
Table 2 illustrates that the average value of funded projects is higher when
adopting policy 2, which is optimal for funding exceptional projects (25.86 vs.
21.22). Furthermore, given that the expected number of exceptional projects in
the population is n ∙α = 200 ∙1% = 2, the adoption of policy 2 results in funding
1.68/2 = 84% of such projects, whereas only 1.28/2 = 64% of them would be595
funded if policy 1 was adopted. However, due to completing only 9 projects out
of 200 proposals in each period – as opposed to 60 completed projects out of 200
resulting from policy 1 – the expected portfolio value of policy 2 is much lower
than that of policy 1 (233 vs. 1,273). Thus, if the potential for extremely high
indirect benefits of exceptional projects is not accounted for, then policies that600
promote such projects may appear cost-inefficient in the short term. Conversely,
funding policies that are cost-efficient in the short term may fail to pick those
projects that could eventually yield extremely high societal benefits.
Figure 8 illustrates the impact of adopting the ‘wrong’ policy as a function
of the initial estimation uncertainty for fast (r = 0.3), moderate (r = 0.65), and605
slow (r = 0.9) rates of uncertainty reduction. In particular, Figure 8a shows
the percentage of the expected portfolio value obtained by adopting a policy
that maximizes the expected number of exceptional projects compared to what
could have been obtained by adopting a policy that maximizes this value. The
optimal abandonment times for the policies maximizing the expected number610
of exceptional projects are also shown.
Insert Figure 8 about here.
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If the initial estimates are perfectly accurate (τ0 = 0), then the optimal pol-
icy is the same for both objectives, i.e., to simply select the best 60 projects out
of the 200 proposals. On the other hand, the less accurate the initial estimates615
and the slower the accuracy is improved, the more similar the optimal policies
are for maximizing the expected portfolio value and the expected number of
exceptional projects. Thus, there is not much difference in the portfolio values
in Figure 8a when, for instance, r = 0.9 and τ0 ≥ 7. However, if the initial esti-
mates are relatively accurate and/or the estimation accuracy improves quickly,620
then resources are optimally spent on launching many but completing only a
few projects. In this case, the expected portfolio value resulting from the maxi-
mization of the number of exceptional projects is much lower compared to when
maximizing this value; especially so if one should wait for two periods instead
of one before abandoning projects, which is the case when τ0 ≥ 8 for r = 0.3,625
and τ0 ≥ 6 for r = 0.65.
Figure 8b illustrates the percentage of the number of exceptional projects
funded by the policy that maximizes the expected portfolio value compared to
the policy that maximizes the expected number of exceptional projects. Here,
the policy that maximizes the expected portfolio value for each τ0 and r is to not630
exercise the option, whereby no optimal abandonment times are shown. When
the initial estimates are very accurate (τ0 ≤ 2), most of the top 1% projects are
funded just by providing full funding for the best projects based on the initial
evaluation, whereby the difference between the shares of exceptional projects
resulting from the two policies is small. This difference remains small even for635
larger values of τ0 when the uncertainty reduces slowly (r = 0.9), because in this
case the optimal policies are not that different. However, if the initial estimates
are very inaccurate (τ0 = 10) – as they typically are – but more accurate esti-
mates can be obtained later on (r = 0.3), then the failure to use such estimates
to abandon projects and, thus, to release resources for launching more projects640
would result in funding only 75% of those exceptional projects that would be
funded by following the optimal strategy for funding exceptional projects. Be-
cause of the potential for extremely high indirect benefits of exceptional projects,
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such a difference is significant.
4.6. Sensitivity analysis645
Finally, we present results on the impact of the variation in parameters n and
B as well as in the shape of the salvage value function h(q). Table 3 shows the
optimal funding policies with respect to the two objectives for different values
of n such that the initial estimation uncertainty τ0 = 7 is reduced by 50% in
each period, i.e., r = 0.5. The level of excellence is α = 1%, the budget is 1.2n,650
and the salvage value function is linear, h(q) = q/d. For n ≤ 50, the optimal
policy for maximizing the expected portfolio value is to provide full funding
to all launched projects, whereas for larger n it pays off to re-evaluate more
than half of the launched projects and abandon quite a few. This is because
the re-evaluation of e projects out of a smaller number n of proposals would655
require a comparatively larger fraction of resources, as the budget B = 1.2n
is defined in proportion to n. Even though some value can now be retrieved
from abandoned projects, it is still optimal for all n to launch, re-evaluate, and
abandon a larger share of projects when maximizing the number of exceptional
projects than when maximizing the expected portfolio value; which is in line660
with the results presented in this section.
Table 3: Optimal funding policies for different values of n.
Expected value Exceptional projects
`
n
e
n
a
n q
`
n
e
n
a
n q
n = 10 30% 0 0 - 30% 30% 10% 2
n = 50 30% 0 0 - 42% 42% 26% 2
n = 200 37% 20% 9% 1 48% 48% 37% 2
n = 500 38% 24% 12% 1 48% 48% 38% 2
Table 4 illustrates the impact of size of the budget B on the optimal funding
policies. Here, n = 200, and the salvage value function is linear, h(q) = q/d.
Budget 120 corresponds to providing full funding for B/(n ∙d) = 120/(200 ∙4) =
15% of the project proposals, budget 240 to 30%, and budget 320 to 40%.665
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The larger the budget, the more projects can be launched, re-evaluated, and
completed ( `n − an ). Again, for all values of B, it is optimal to launch, re-
evaluate, and abandon a larger share of projects when maximizing the expected
number of exceptional projects than when maximizing the expected portfolio
value.
Table 4: Optimal funding policies for different values of B.
Expected value Exceptional projects
`
n
e
n
a
n
`
n − an q `n en an `n − an q
B = 120 19% 10% 6% 13% 1 22% 22% 15% 7% 2
B = 240 37% 20% 9% 28% 1 48% 48% 37% 11% 2
B = 320 49% 40% 18% 31% 2 64% 64% 49% 15% 2
670
Finally, Table 5 illustrates the optimal policies for different shapes of the sal-
vage value function h(q): constant zero, convex, linear, concave and S-shaped
(see Figure 9). The constant zero h(q) describes, for instance, sequential tech-
nology development projects (Roberts and Weitzman, 1981) in which all stages
must be completed to receive any benefits. The S-shaped salvage value function,675
in turn, is widely used for modeling the performance improvement of technolo-
gies over their lifetimes, whereas the convex salvage value function describes
sharply increasing performance curves such as the improvement in micropro-
cessor transistor density over time (Schilling, 2008). The linear salvage value
function has been criticized for decades for failing to describe project develop-680
ment realistically, especially when little is initially known about the project’s
future value (Godin, 2005); indeed, the linear h(q) as well as the rarely used
concave h(q) are included in this analysis for the sake of reference.
Insert Figure 9 about here.
Here, n = 200, and the budget is B = 240. Because the objective function685
for maximizing the expected number of exceptional projects does not depend
on the salvage value function, the optimal policy for this objective is the same
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for all choices of h(q), namely (95, 95, 73, 2) = (48%, 48%, 37%, 2). When h(q)
in constant zero or convex, the optimal policy for maximizing the expected
portfolio value is to give full funding to all launched projects. This is because a690
large share of a project’s value can be obtained only if the project is completed
– in fact, all of it, if h(q) is constant zero –, whereby it does not pay off to
abandon projects prematurely.
Table 5: Funding policies that maximize the expected portfolio value for different salvage
value functions h(q).
` e a q
h(q) ≡ 0 30% 0 0 -
h(q) convex 30% 0 0 -
h(q) linear 37% 20% 9% 1
h(q) concave 100% 100% 95% 1
h(q) S-shaped 39% 39% 38% 3
The above conclusion does not, however, hold when h(q) is concave or S-
shaped. If the salvage value function is concave, then the expected portfolio695
value would be maximized by launching all 200 projects but abandoning 190
(i.e., 95%) of them after just one period. It may not, however, be very realistic
to assume that almost half of the projects’ benefits would be obtained after
only a quarter of the projects’ duration (Figure 9). Also, if the function h(q)
is S-shaped, then it would be optimal to abandon nearly all launched projects700
just one period before completion. By doing so, one would avoid the costs of
funding projects in the last period, when little additional value is generated.
This kind of a situation could, however, be interpreted such that the projects
are essentially completed at the time of abandonment. Hence, the optimal policy
would actually correspond to providing full funding for all launched projects,705
which is consistent with the results reported in this section.
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5. Discussion and Conclusions
Breakthrough technologies that yield extremely high benefits for society are
very rare. Hence, the fostering of breakthrough technologies is typically pursued
by trying to fund exceptionally valuable technology projects that have the po-710
tential to result in breakthroughs. Our results suggest that if the objective is to
maximize the expected number of exceptional projects, the optimal policy is to
experiment on a large number of projects for some time and, based on this ex-
perimentation, commit resources only to those few projects which appear best.
This policy differs from the policy of maximizing expected portfolio value, which715
is to provide full funding to those projects that appear best based on the initial
value estimates. These differences are important in that a policy which serves
to maximize the expected portfolio value may fail to promote breakthrough
technologies. Conversely, a policy which serves to promote breakthrough tech-
nologies may result in lower average short-term portfolio value, because many720
ongoing projects will be discontinued before completion.
The abandonment option involves a trade-off between allocating resources to
(i) the completion of on-going projects and (ii) the acquisition of more accurate
evaluations to support interim project abandonment decisions. In the absence
of interim evaluations, resources will be tied to projects for their entire duration725
and consequently fewer new projects can be launched, meaning that there is a
risk of failing to launch new projects that could have resulted in a breakthrough.
Still, if more projects are launched and these projects are funded longer, it
follows that more projects will have to be abandoned due to the scarcity of
resources. In fact, the risk of missing out on breakthrough technologies is partly730
decreased by the ability to select which projects should be completed based on
more accurate value information, but partly increased by the fact that fewer
projects can be completed.
In our model, the trade-off between the number of completed projects and
the acquisition of more accurate project evaluations is explicit, as is the de-735
pendence of this trade-off on the accuracy of the initial evaluations and the
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rate at which this accuracy is improved through experimentation. In particular,
our results suggest that the more uncertain the initial evaluations, the more
resources should be devoted to acquiring value information through (i) experi-
menting longer, if the evaluation accuracy improves slowly, or (ii) launching and740
abandoning more projects, if the evaluation accuracy improves quickly.
The rate at which the evaluation accuracy improves depends on several fac-
tors, such as the nature of the technological field or the phase of the innovation
process. Nevertheless, in some cases both the initial evaluation accuracy and
rate at which the accuracy is improved can be affected by allocating more re-745
sources to project evaluation through obtaining more evaluations of each project
or using more competent evaluators, for instance. Our model could be extended
to support such resource allocation decisions by (i) treating the evaluation cost
ce as a decision variable instead of a constant, and (ii) modeling the standard
deviation τ0 of the initial estimation error and the uncertainty reduction coeffi-750
cient r as decreasing functions of ce. Other model parameters, too, can be used
to capture various information that is likely to influence policy making: for in-
stance, differences in the size and stage of development of the national economy
could be accounted for by using different kinds of prior distributions f(v) for
the projects’ values such that higher mean values and longer upper tails of f(v)755
would be associated with larger and more developed economies.
The model could also be extended to cases in which k ≥ 2 instead of just one
interim evaluation may be acquired. The decision variables in such a multistage
model would correspond to the number of projects that are, in the beginning of
each stage, funded for their remaining duration, funded until the next evaluation760
stage, or abandoned. Then, the analytic results of Proposition 1 would hold
for decisions made at any given stage of this process, but the exponentially
increasing number of feasible combinations of decision variables would make it
very time-consuming to compute optimal funding policies for larger values of
k. To keep the computational effort at a reasonable level, optimality conditions765
such as that in Proposition 2 would need to be derived for multistage funding
policies as well.
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Funding practices in which the continuation of funding is based on interim
evaluation of projects are widely used by private companies (Sahlman, 1990;
Tellis et al., 2009; Klingebiel and Rammer, 2011). For example, when devel-770
oping a new oil field, a firm may scale back planned investments to limit its
downside exposure if oil prices, production rates, or reserves turn out to be be-
low expectations (Smith and McCardle, 1999). Staged funding is also standard
practice for venture capitalist firms (Tian, 2011; Li and Chi, 2013). This is
partly due to the need to establish incentives for the start-up entrepreneur to775
meet the stage targets (Gompers, 1995), but also due to the inability to pre-
dict accurately based on the business plan whether the start-up is going to be
successful (Blank, 2013).
In comparison, many well-known research funding agencies which empha-
size the objective of promoting breakthrough research are effectively employing780
funding policies which, in our model, resemble those that maximize the expected
portfolio value. Specifically, these agencies typically commit to funding all ap-
proved projects for a long time, e.g., for up to five years (Heinze, 2008), which
also means that the process of launching projects is highly selective. Indeed,
the success rate of applications to the high-risk, high-reward programme of the785
NIH is 5% (Gewin, 2012). Much in the same vein, the success rate for ERC
starting grants has remained below 16% over the years, reaching an all-time low
of 3.4% in 20072.
Our model is generic and, hence, relevant to different project portfolio se-
lection contexts. Yet, our model does not account for the specific details that790
appear in different project selection settings. For instance, we do not explicitly
distinguish between different phases of technology development and commer-
cialization, or between different public policy instruments for supporting break-
through innovations. Furthermore, there may be important differences between
research grants that are awarded based on the applicant’s track record and those795
that are selected based on a peer review that is focused on the submitted applica-
2Source: http://erc.europa.eu/statistics-0, retrieved February 19, 2015.
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tion alone. There may also be administrative reasons for why private companies
have embraced the abandonment option in their funding policies, while most re-
search funding agencies have not. This notwithstanding, our model serves to
highlight that breakthrough technologies can be best fostered by (i) experi-800
menting by initiating a large set of technology projects, and (ii) committing
resources only to those projects that, based on the experimentation, seem to
have the potential to result in breakthroughs.
Acknowledgments
This research has been supported by the Finnish Funding Agency for Tech-805
nology and Innovation (Tekes, 40419/11). We are grateful to editor Tugrul
Daim and three anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on the
manuscript. We would also like to express our gratitude to the Academy of
Finland (267503), the Finnish Science Foundation for Economics and Technol-
ogy (KAUTE, 201300087) and the Marcus Wallenberg foundation (5-1507-12)810
for their financial support to Juuso Liesiö and Eeva Vilkkumaa.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Given the initial estimates s0i , the posterior distributions
for the projects’ future values (Vi|S0i = s0i ) are f(v|s0i ) = N(v0i , ρ20) ∀i ∈ N , where the
variance ρ20 = σ
2τ20 /(σ
2 + τ20 ) is the same for all projects. Prior to observing the in-815
terim estimates sqi , the projects’ posterior distributions are f(v|Sqi , s0i ) = N(E[Vi|S0i =
s0i , S
q
i ], ρ
2
q), where the variance ρ
2
q = r
2qτ20 ρ
2
0/(ρ
2
0 + r
2qτ20 ) is the same for all projects.
The expected values are random variables E[Vi|S0i = s0i , Sqi ] ∼ N(v0i , ξ2q ), where the
variance ξ2q = ρ
4
0/(ρ
2
0 + r
2qτ20 ) = ρ
2
0 − ρ2q is the same for all projects.
We introduce random variables Xi = E[g(Vi)|S0i = s0i , Sqi ], i ∈ N , where g :
R → R is a non-decreasing function. Particularly, if g(t) = gL(t) = t, then Xi =
E[Vi|S0i = s0i , Sqi ], and by the law of total expectation ESqi [Xi] = ESqi [E[Vi|S
0
i =
s0i , S
q
i ]] = E[Vi|S0i = s0i ]. If, in turn, g(t) is the step function
gS(t) =
 0 for all t < μ
∗
α
1 for all t ≥ μ∗α,
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then Xi = P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i = s0i , Sqi ), and by the law of total expectation ESqi [Xi] =820
E[gS(Vi)|S0i = s0i ] = P(Vi ≥ μ∗α|S0i = s0i ).
Using this notation, we can define a general portfolio selection problem for a fixed
funding policy (`, e, a, q) and a set of fixed initial estimates s0i , i ∈ N :
max
L⊆N ,E⊆L
|L|=`, E|=e
{ ∑
i∈L\E
ESqi [Xi] + ESq
[
max
A⊆E
|A|=a
{ ∑
i∈E\A
Xi + h(q)
∑
i∈A
Xi]
}]}
, (12)
which corresponds to the inner problem of (7) if g = gL and h : {1, . . . , d−1} → [0, 1),
and to the inner problem of (8) if g = gS and h(q) ≡ 0. To prove the proposition, it
is thus sufficient to show that (9)–(11) hold for Problem (12) for any feasible policy
(`, e, a, q). To accomplish this we establish that
v0k > v
0
j ⇔ ESq
k
[Xk] > ESqj [Xj ] ⇔ FXk (x) ¯ FXj (x) ∀x, (13)
which follows from the fact that the cumulative distribution function of Xi is FXi(x) =
Φ((x− v0i )/ξq) if g = gL, and
FXi(x) =

0, x ≤ 0,
Φ
(μ∗α+ρqΦ−1(x)−v0i
ξq
)
, 0 < x < 1,
1, x ≥ 1,
if g = gS (Taboga, 2012).
Proof of (9) Take any Lˆ ⊆ N and Eˆ ⊆ Lˆ, such that |Lˆ| = ` and |Eˆ | = e. When
choosing which project to abandon (i.e., A), the interim estimates sqi are known so
that also the realizations of the random variables Xi = E[g(Vi)|S0i = s0i , Sqi ], i ∈ Eˆ are825
known; denote these by xi = E[g(Vi)|S0i = s0i , Sqi = sqi ], i ∈ Eˆ . Take any Aˆ ⊆ Eˆ such
that |Aˆ| = a, and assume there exist j ∈ Eˆ \ Aˆ and k ∈ Aˆ such that xk > xj . Then,
evaluating the objective function of the inner maximization of problem in (12) at (i)
A = Aˆ and at (ii) A = Aˆ \ {k} ∪ {j}, and computing the difference between these
values gives830
(i)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈Eˆ\Aˆ
xi + h(q)
∑
i∈Aˆ
xi−[
(ii)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈(Eˆ\Aˆ)\{j}∪{k}
xi + h(q)
∑
i∈Aˆ\{k}∪{j}
xi] =
xj + h(q)xk − xk − h(q)xj = (1− h(q))(xj − xk) < 0,
where the inequality is implied by the assumption that xk > xj and the fact that
h(q) ∈ [0, 1). Hence, the objective function could be improved by abandoning project
j instead of k.
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Proof of (10). Take any Lˆ ⊆ N and Eˆ ⊆ Lˆ such that |Lˆ| = ` and |Eˆ | = e. Assume
there exist j ∈ Lˆ \ Eˆ and k ∈ Eˆ such that v0k > v0j . Let X(1) ≥ . . . ≥ X(e−1) be835
the order statistics of the random variables Xi, i ∈ Eˆ \ {k} and let Ps:s = ∑si=s X(i).
Then, evaluating the objective function of problem (12) at (i) L = Lˆ, E = Eˆ and at
(ii) L = Lˆ, E = Eˆ \{k} ∪ {j}, and computing the difference gives
(i)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈Lˆ\Eˆ
ESqi [Xi] + ESq
[
max
{
P1:e−a + h(q)(Xk + Pe−a+1:e−1), (P1:e−a−1 + Xk) + h(q)Pe−a:e−1
}]
−
(ii)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈(Lˆ\Eˆ)\{j}∪{k}
ESqi [Xi]− ESq
[
max
{
P1:e−a + h(q)(Xj + Pe−a+1:e−1), (P1:e−a−1 + Xj) + h(q)Pe−a:e−1
}]
=
ESq
[
Xj + P1:e−a−1 + h(q)Pe−a+1:e−1 + max
{
X(e−a) + h(q)Xk, h(q)X(e−a) + Xk
}]
−ESq
[
Xk + P1:e−a−1 + h(q)Pe−a+1:e−1 + max
{
X(e−a) + h(q)Xj , h(q)X(e−a) + Xj
}]
=
ESq [max
{
X(e−a) + h(q)Xk, h(q)X(e−a) + Xk
}−Xk]− ESq [max{X(e−a) + h(q)Xj , h(q)X(e−a) + Xj}−Xj ] =
ESq [max
{
X(e−a) − (1− h(q))Xk, h(q)X(e−a)
}
]− ESq [max
{
X(e−a) − (1− h(q))Xj , h(q)X(e−a)
}
] =
ESq [max
{
(h(q)− 1)Xk, (h(q)− 1)X(e−a)
}
+ X(e−a)]− ESq [max
{
(h(q)− 1)Xj , (h(q)− 1)X(e−a)
}
+ X(e−a)] =
(h(q)− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(
ESq [min{Xk, X(e−a)}]− ESq [min{Xj , X(e−a)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0 by (13)
)
< 0.
Hence the objective function value could be improved by evaluating project j instead
of k.840
Proof of (11). Take any Lˆ ⊆ N and Eˆ ⊆ Lˆ, such that |Lˆ| = ` and |Eˆ | = e. Assume
there exists j ∈ Lˆ and k /∈ Lˆ such that v0k > v0j .
First, assume j /∈ Eˆ . Let X(1) ≥ . . . ≥ X(|E|) be the order statistics of the random
variables Xi, i ∈ Eˆ and let Ps:s = ∑si=s X(i). Evaluating the objective function of
problem (12) at (i) L = Lˆ, E = Eˆ and at (ii) L = Lˆ \ {j}∪ {k}, E = Eˆ , and computing845
the difference gives
(i)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈Lˆ\Eˆ
ESqi [Xi] + ESq [P1:e−a + h(q)Pe−a+1:e]−
(ii)︷ ︸︸ ︷[ ∑
i∈(Lˆ\Eˆ)\{j}∪{k}
ESqi [Xi] + ESq [P1:e−a + h(q)Pe−a+1:e]
]
=
ESqj [Xj ]− ESqk [Xk] < 0,
where the inequality is implied by (13). Hence the objective function value could be
improved by launching project k instead of j.
Second, assume that j ∈ Eˆ . Let X(1) ≥ . . . ≥ X(e−1) be the order statistics of
the random variables Xi, i ∈ Eˆ \ {j} and let Ps:s = ∑si=s X(i). Then, evaluating the850
objective function of problem (12) at (i) L = Lˆ, E = Eˆ and at (ii) L = Lˆ \ {j} ∪ {k},
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E = Eˆ \{j} ∪ {k}, and computing the difference gives
(i)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈Lˆ\Eˆ
ESqi [Xi]+ESq
[
max
{
P1:e−a−1 + Xj + h(q)Pe−a:e−1, P1:e−a + h(q)(Pe−a+1:e−1 + Xj)
}]−
−
(ii)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈Lˆ\Eˆ
ESqi [Xi]− ESq
[
max
{
P1:e−a−1 + Xk + h(q)Pe−a:e−1, P1:e−a + h(q)(Pe−a+1:e−1 + Xk)
}]
=
ESq
[
max
{
Xj + h(q)X(e−a), X(e−a) + h(q)Xj
}−max{Xk + h(q)X(e−a), X(e−a) + h(q)Xk}] =
h(q)ESq [Xj −Xk]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 by (13)
+(1− h(q))ESq [max{Xj , X(e−a)} −max{Xk, X(e−a)}]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0 by (13)
< 0
where the inequality is implied by fact that h(q) ∈ [0, 1). Hence the objective function
value could be improved by launching and evaluating project k instead of j¤.
Proof of Proposition 2: Let us use the same notation as in the proof of Proposi-855
tion 1. Let (`, e, a, q) be the optimal solution to (12), which represents both problem (7)
with g = gL, h : {1, . . . , d − 1} → [0, 1) and problem (8) with g = gS , h(q) ≡ 0. To
prove the proposition, it is thus sufficient to show that policy (`, e+1, a, q) is infeasible
for (12). Assume to the contrary that (`, e + 1, a, q) is feasible for (12). Let Lˆ and
Eˆ be the optimal index sets for the optimal policy (`, e, a, q) such that j ∈ Lˆ j /∈ Eˆ .860
Let X(1) ≥ . . . ≥ X(e) be the order statistics of the random variables Xi, i ∈ Eˆ and
let Ps:s =
∑s
i=s X(i). Then, evaluating the objective function of problem (12) at (i)
L = Lˆ, E = Eˆ and at (ii) L = Lˆ, E = Eˆ ∪{j} (i.e., |E| = e + 1), and computing the
difference gives
(ii)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈Lˆ\(Eˆ∪{j})
ESqi [Xi] + ESq
[
max
{
P1:e−a + Xj + h(q)Pe−a+1:e, P1:e−a+1 + h(q)(Pe−a+2:e + Xj)
}]−
−
(i)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i∈Lˆ\Eˆ
ESqi [Xi]− ESq
[
P1:e−a + h(q)Pe−a+1:e
]
=
ESqi
[
max{P1:e−a + Xj + h(q)Pe−a+1:e −Xj − P1:e−a − h(q)Pe−a+1:e,
P1:e−a+1 + h(q)(Pe−a+2:e + Xj)−Xj − P1:e−a − h(q)Pe−a+1:e}
]
=
(1− h(q))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
ESq
[
max
{
0, X(e−a+1) −Xj}
]
> 0,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that X(e−a+1) > Xj with a positive865
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probability. This, however, contradicts the assumption that policy (`, e, a, q) is optimal
for (12), whereby (`, e + 1, a, q) must be infeasible¤.
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Figure 1: Illustration of the excellence threshold.
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Figure 2: Portfolio selection process for project proposals arriving at the beginning of period
t.
43
1 2 3 4
0
50
100
150
200
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
jec
ts
Period
(a) Accurate estimates, expected value
1 2 3 4
0
50
100
150
200
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
jec
ts
Period
(b) Inaccurate estimates, expected value
1 2 3 4
0
50
100
150
200
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
jec
ts
Period
(c) Accurate estimates, exceptional projects
1 2 3 4
0
50
100
150
200
N
um
be
r o
f p
ro
jec
ts
Period
(d) Inaccurate estimates, exceptional projects
R R
R
R
CF
FF FF
C C
A
FF FF FFFF FF FF FF FF
C
FFFF
CFCF
A
C C
Figure 3: The optimal funding policies when the objective is to maximize the expected portfo-
lio value (a)-(b), or the expected number of funded projects among the top 1% (c)-(d). 5,000
simulation rounds (Monte Carlo).
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Figure 4: The optimal funding policies for fast (r = 0.4) or slow (r = 0.8) rate of uncertainty
reduction, when the objective is to maximize the expected number of funded projects among
the top 10% or top 1%. 5,000 simulation rounds (Monte Carlo).
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Figure 5: Optimal abandonment time q for maximizing the expected number of exceptional
projects. 5,000 simulation rounds (Monte Carlo).
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Figure 6: Value of the abandonment option in maximizing the expected number of exceptional
projects for different values of τ0 and r. 5,000 simulation rounds (Monte Carlo).
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Figure 7: Value of the abandonment option for different values of τ0 and α. 5,000 simulation
rounds (Monte Carlo).
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(a) Share of expected portfolio value
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Figure 8: (a): The percentage of the expected portfolio value resulting from a policy that
maximizes the expected number of exceptional projects compared to a policy that maximizes
this value. (b): The percentage of exceptional projects funded with a policy that maximizes
the expected portfolio value compared to a policy that maximizes the expected number of
exceptional projects. 5,000 simulation rounds (Monte Carlo).
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